

THE NEO-HELLENIC ENLIGHTENMENT (1750-1821)

A GENERAL SURVEY

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It is not too rash to suppose that the downfall of the Byzantine Empire had a notable effect on the West. This Empire had served as a link between the West and Asia ; now that the link was broken, the West turned toward the Atlantic and to the New World further west. The Mediterranean Axis was replaced by the Atlantic Axis. But there was a further important consequence; the link between the West and Greece was broken. This article will try to establish two somewhat contradictory reflections: (a) The conquest of the Byzantine Empire by the Turks (completed and symbolized by the fall of Constantinople in 1453) means that Greece missed the full impact of the Renaissance; (b) Despite its domination by the Turks, Greece did experience the Renaissance, partly due to an inner self-awakening and partly due to a continuing infiltration of the western ideas through the (Ottoman) 'Iron Curtain.' Indeed the purpose of this article is to demonstrate that there was a continuous cultural life among the Greek people during the Turkish occupation; and that the Greek Renaissance reached its peak in what may be appropriately described as the Neo- Hellenic Enlightenment—a state of affairs which flourished for about seventy-five to a hundred years up to 1821. But my topic is as much Greek thought and culture during this period as it is professional philosophy.

The average reader may be surprised to learn that during the presumably Dark Ages of the Turkish conquest (1453-1821) scholarship, education, intellectual inquiry and *professional philosophy* were cultivated to a notable degree. As we shall see, the Greek Orthodox Church was a considerable factor in providing a shield for learning from the onslaughts of the Turks; yet the protection afforded by the Church was of an ambiguous value as may be easily supposed. Although the philosophic thought was not particularly original—not striking out new paths but mostly consisting in the transmission of both ancient and recent Western thought—and although the greater number of the Greek philosophers and thinkers were ecclesiastics, obliged to compromise with the external pressure of the Church and with their own theological predilections, Greek philosophy during this period was to a considerable degree sound, substantial and scholarly. Furthermore, it was secularistic and humanistic in tone to an astonishing degree. Perhaps the Greek philosophers who appeared on the scene during what I have called 'the Dark Ages' of modern Greece are

better viewed as primarily teachers of the race, preserving the flame of the spirit and imparting the light of the modern West to their conationals. In other words, 'the Dark Ages' were not very dark, and were even bright at times. It is true that many of the writings of the philosophers in question remain unpublished and their manuscripts are dispersed in the archives of various libraries scattered in Greece; some of the manuscripts and also some of the published works have been destroyed or lost. There are, too, a good many philosophical conceptions which were projected but not executed in writing by the thinkers, of which only outlines remain, either prepared by the putative authors themselves, or preserved in the form of notes taken of the lectures by their pupils.

When Constantinople fell to the Turkish conqueror, most of the liberal and progressive minds departed for the West, while generally speaking, the conservatives remained. Of the latter we may cite Gen- nadius, the first Patriarch under Turkish rule, who is reputed to have said, " I may be a Hellene in language but not otherwise; for I am a Christian he denounced Greek antiquity as un-Christian, thus identifying classical Hellenism with paganism. Contrast him now with George Plctho who insisted that " we are Hellenes in race, as both our language and our tradition testify." Plctho (living in Mistra, Peloponnesus) revived the learning of ancient Greece before the fall of the Byzantine Empire and by such revival gave promise of a break with scholasticism and of a Renaissance like the one which emerged in the West. As is well known, Plctho was a student of Plato and a nco-Platonist. In a fashion he attempted to destroy the fusion of Hellenism -with Christian thought which had been effected by the Church Fathers. Pletho, although remaining a Christian, was an apostate too, appealing to reason as against dogma and revelation; he was a visionary and a social reformer. Pletho was anathematized by Gennadius who delivered his work ' Nomoi * to the flames.

Thus, the Greek Renaissance may be said to have begun from within the Byzantine Empire and even before the fall of Constant- nople, while also contributing to the emergence of the Western Renaissance by virtue of the migration of Greek scholars after the fall. In turn, the Western Renaissance helped to bring about the revival of learning in Greece later on. (It is reported that there were twenty Greek professors teaching in the University of Padua in 1572.) Indeed, many of the Greeks who went abroad for study during the Turkish occupation did so at the University of Padua which was hospitable to non-Roman Catholics. The influence of Italy (Venice included) upon Greek thought was most marked; in later years, Germany and France too attracted students from occupied Greece.

The Turkish Attitude. Since the reader may wonder how it was possible for learning to flourish among the Greeks when dominated by a race which was as military-minded as the Turks, a word will be in order about the attitude of the Turkish authorities toward their Greek subjects. The Turks imposed a special capitation tax on the *rayahs* (subject-races) so long as they remained unconverted to Islam; thus this tax was intended as a bait to the non-Moslem population to embrace the Islamic faith. The Greeks were forbidden to carry arms and to ride on horseback. The Turks imposed a land tax too; indeed theirs may be described as a feudal system with the peasants as tenant-farmers. About every five years the Turks engaged in *pedomazoma*—that is to say, a recruitment of boys for the corps of the Ottoman Janissaries. It is estimated that at such a time a fifth of the total boys' population was recruited and lost to the Greeks. The Turkish feudal chiefs were apt to be domineering, arrogant, and often cruel and brutal; when the whim struck them, they would steal Greek girls and women, and imprison and decapitate males. But such oppressive measures wore the result of caprice rather than of planned deliberate policy.

It was indeed very soon after the capture of Constantinople that Mehmet the Conqueror invited Gennadius to become a Patriarch, granting him complete authority in ecclesiastical matters. In granting self-government to the Church, the Conqueror granted much more in effect. For the Church was vested with far-reaching temporal powers in judicial, fiscal, and administrative areas. It had a limited authority even in criminal cases, and a much greater one in political cases.

Beyond this, political power was vested in the Greek laity. There was local devolution, with the *Koinotes* (community-village or town) as the administrative unit. As much as the Church, the *Koinotes* was a vital factor in preserving and fostering Greek national spirit during the foreign domination. The *Koinotes* was fairly democratic (less so in the islands), being governed by primates (*Kojabashi*) whose duties consisted in collecting the taxes, negotiating with the local Pasha, providing police-protection and caring for the welfare of their public.

Returning now to the subject of the Church, the Islamic sacred law prescribed religious toleration, and it was also true that a strong Greek Orthodox Church would offer protection to the Turks against any machinations of foreign religious-political propaganda. On the whole, the Turks respected Greek institutions and customs; and Mehmet the Conqueror's attitude toward his Greek subjects might be compared with that of Philip of Macedon to the ancient Athenians

whom he had conquered. Of course it is difficult to separate self-interest from such attitudes for these are always mixed in the realm of politics.

Primarily concerned with ruling and with military enterprise, the Turks allowed the Greeks to take over a large share of the business of the country. The imposition of special duties on Greek goods and merchandise proved a boomerang; standing to gain more from the Greek than from the Turkish business enterprises, the Turkish fiscal administration understandably favored the former. But what is of greater relevance to the topic of this article is the fact that the Turks granted to the Greeks autonomy in education which was—as already noted—wholly in the hands of the Greek Church.

Education. Gennadius founded the Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople for the education of the clergy, in which some little philosophy was taught, chiefly Aristotelian dialectic, rhetoric, and ethics. During the Turkish occupation there was a considerable number of Greek schools (academies or museums, as they were called) both within and without Greece; in addition to the Patriarchal Academy there were academies in Smyrna, Chios, Kydoniai, Yannina, Mt. Athos, Bucharest, Jassy, and other places. The Academy at Yannina (Epirus) was much strengthened and influenced by its proximity to Venice. At various times, there were Greek printing presses in Venice, Vienna, Paris, Leipzig, Amsterdam, Bucharest, Constantinople, and considerable libraries in various locations. Also, as we have seen, many Greeks studied abroad in foreign universities—reaching as far as England; and at Venice there was a Greek academy (the Flanginian).

Curiously enough, the intellectual activity which reached its peak during the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment, declined and lost its vigor with the achievement of Greek independence in the course of the war of 1821-7. What is the explanation of this weakening? Perhaps the national and political struggle absorbed and drained the vitality of the Greek people to the detriment of intellectual activity. Some of the decline may be blamed to the very success of the effort. The new wholly free intercourse with the West, the complete tearing down of the Iron Curtain, made the incursion of western ideas into Greece so much easier that by 1850 some critics complained that Greece was becoming a cultural province of the West. But the chief reason for the decline is probably the fact that, with liberation, the boundaries of the Greek nation became identified with those of the Greek state. This meant a serious contraction; thus, Constantinople, the Ionian and many of the Aegean Islands, Crete, Asia Minor (with its schools at Smyrna and Kydoniai) remained outside the orbit of the Greek nation to the impoverishment of Greek culture. The Greek revolution substituted regional Hellenism for ecumenical Hellenism.

The Church. The various schools were generously supported by the rising Greek merchant class. But, as I have noted, the promotion of education and consequently of learning and philosophy, was the primary responsibility of the Church. The Church genuinely intended to bring the light of knowledge to the Greek population and did well in its efforts; also, it was tolerant of dissent, especially in its earlier phases. It was the famous patriarch, Cyril Loukaris who appointed the ‘ philosopher ’ Korydaleus as director of the Patriarchal Academy. The Church stimulated and encouraged learning. But, as may be supposed, the Church was sometimes a doubtful leader of the intellectual enterprise. As time went on, it became less and less tolerant of dissent, and the *coup de grace* was given by the French Revolution. And of course, along with its fear of political innovation, the Church felt that its dogmas were being undermined by the new^r spirit of science; furthermore, there were the literary philosophers like Voltaire whom it viewed with suspicion and animosity. Some of the scholars were themselves wholly traditional, even reactionary. Thus Sergius, who lectured on science declaimed against Copernicus and Newton, calling them anti-theists (<W0<>t). But most of the scholars and philosophers, while professing (most probably, sincerely) their devotion to dogma, took the path of reason and found themselves denounced by the Church, and their works anathematized and burned. The scholars were clerics and some of them recanted. But what they normally taught was that the earth is a sphere, that it revolves around the sun, that it is not the center of the universe, that Newton’s laws hold sway in the natural world, that human nature is amenable to study by scientific method (Locke), that the good of man consists less in heavenly bliss than in happiness on earth. The Church, at first tolerant and even friendly to such views, then neutral, became abruptly (circa 1790) and finally uncompromising in its hostility. Thus, several of the later Patriarchs admonished the learned men not to occupy their minds with the European *μυροσοφία* (foolish wisdom), which, they asserted, was contrary to the Christian faith; “ the Platos, the Aristotles, the Cartesians, the triangles and the logarithms induce an indifference to divine matters.”

Cyril Loukaris, already cited, was a remarkable churchman, deserving a separate paragraph. He was an active reformer both in the Church and outside; he wrote in the demotic idiom and authorized the translation of the New Testament into the language of the people. He worked manfully to enlarge their intellectual horizons and established a printing-press (16.37) especially for the publication of books in the Greek language. Born in Crete in 1572, he died in 1638. His collaboration with the Protestants (to be discussed shortly) signified an attempt to open a window through which the air of new ideas

might enter and be breathed into the Greek organism. He was educated abroad—in Venice and Padua—and when thirty years old was already Patriarch of Alexandria. He served as Patriarch of the Church in Constantinople (with several interruptions) in the period between 1620 and 1638. During the tenure of this office, he had to face the constant hostility of the Roman Catholic Church which, having lost so many of its adherents to Protestantism, was now trying to recoup its losses by converting the Greek Orthodox. The Jesuits were specially active in this effort. Politics and religion worked hand in hand, indeed intermingling so closely that it is difficult to separate the working of the one from that of the other. Both the Vatican and the French made representations at the Sublime Porte in order to dethrone Loukaris, sometimes with success, while the British and the Dutch strenuously defended him to the Turkish authorities. Loukaris' zeal for reform led him to work closely with the Protestants; apparently he tried to introduce the spirit of Protestantism into the Greek Orthodox Church. The Jesuits accused him of being a Calvinist—at any rate, a crypto-Calvinist. There is extant today a confession (*ομολογία*) bearing the signature of Loukaris, in which he rejects the infallibility of the theological tradition, denies that the saints are intermediaries between the worshipper and God; while honoring the icons, he denies that they are to be worshipped, proclaims himself in favor of faith as against works and finally rejects the dogma of the real presence in the bread and wine. Loukaris engaged in correspondence with Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, and later with Laud.

But all these sayings and doings must be very carefully scrutinized. Several questions arise without the possibility of their being answered decisively. Is the confession genuine or spurious? Present-day Greek scholars are divided in this matter. And even if we suppose that the confession was genuine in the sense that it was actually written by Loukaris, was it genuine in spirit, did it express his genuine conviction? Was it not, perhaps, a political maneuver, undertaken in order to engage the support of the Protestant powers in his struggle against the aggressive tactics of the Latins? In short, was Loukaris doing religion, or was he doing politics; or was he doing both? It may be that he was simply and essentially a Greek nationalist, striving with all his strength and wit to preserve the integrity of the Greek people and of its faith and, in this process, using Protestants, Roman Catholics and Moslems as pawns, playing off each against the others. I doubt that the truth of the matter will become known. Loukaris was vilified by the Jesuits to the Turks, as plotting a revolution with the aid of Russia. So Loukaris was executed by the Sultan Murad—the first patriarch to be put to death by the Turks.

Phanari. The Patriarchate of Constantinople was situated in Phanari, a quarter on the Golden Horn. Phanari was not a ghetto; it stands for Byzantium after its fall. By Phanari I refer to (a) the Church, of which I have already written, (b) the Phanariote aristocracy and (c) the merchant class.

The Phanariotes were an important factor in the promotion of Greek culture. Bred and brought up in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Constantinople, they were more advanced culturally than the rest of the Greeks. They were convinced of the value of education and organized schools in which the demotic language was used; also they founded Greek academies in Constantinople and elsewhere, for instance, in Bucharest and Jassy. In speaking of the Phanariotes now I mean the laity (laics) who, as perhaps is to be expected, were more progressive than the Church; they were rationalists and antischolastics, favoring Descartes (but Aristotle as well), and imbued with the spirit of inquiry. As progressives and liberals they were ahead of the Church; and indeed fissures opened here and there between them and the Church. The Phanariotes represented the aristocratic families, sometimes claiming descent from the Byzantine aristocracy; however, there were a good many who came from outside Constantinople (as for instance from Albania and Moldavia) but who became completely Hellenized and adopted the Orthodox faith. Their political ideal toward the end of the eighteenth century was that of enlightened despotism somewhat in the manner of Plato's government by a philosopher king. During the eighteenth century and earlier, these Phanariotes held high office in the Turkish government, as dragomans and hospodars or governors of provinces. Most notable among them was Alexander Mavrogordatos (1636-1709) who was Dragoman at the Sublime Porte—and so was charged with an important role in the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire—yet at the same time, a philosophical thinker and writer. Among his works (mostly unpublished) may be cited his Rhetoric and Grammar (he spent some time as a teacher in the Patriarchal Academy) and especially his *Φροντισματα* (Inquiries) in which he maintained the need for moral principles and moral education, put forth the ideal of a balanced life, and espoused something like the doctrine of the Stoics concerning the acceptance of fortune and misfortune. Alexander's son Nicholas Mavrogordatos was Dragoman and also governor of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia; and was succeeded in the same office as governor by his son Constantine.

(c) The Phanariot aristocracy was followed by the rising and eventually wealthy merchant class who proved generous supporters of education. They were self-made men, nearer to the soil, more progressive than the aristocracy, so much so that in reaction, the latter gradually adopted a more conservative point of view.

These were, then, the three forces for Hellenic culture in Ottoman-dominated Byzantium: the Church, the Phanariot aristocracy, and the middle-class businessmen. It must have become evident to the reader that I have been rather free with large generalizations and covering long expanses of time. But I have felt that some sort of preliminary survey, even though sketchy, was necessary before I considered my professed topic. Before I proceed I must express my extreme indebtedness to two works: *NeoiAghvñ filooofia A* (Neo-Hellenic Philosophy, Vol. I, Athens, 1053). This is an anthology of the writings of Greek philosophers who flourished during 1560-1855, edited by the eminent contemporary Greek philosopher, Dr. E. P. Papanoutsos. The other work covers a much broader area and deals with literary figures as well as philosophers; its title is *Ίστορία των Έλληνικη Λογοτιχvñs* (History of Neo-Hellenic Literature, Athens); and its author is K. Th. Dimaras. My debt is naturally greater to the first of these two books. In addition to furnishing fairly extensive and typical extracts from the philosophical writings, Dr. Papanoutsos provides in his introduction a most illuminating and analytical survey of the philosophical activity of this period, reinforced by intelligent critical judgments and informed biographical comments.

His book begins with extracts from the philosophical writing of Theophilos Korydaleus (1560-1646) about whom I propose to make some remarks despite the fact that he antedates by far the period of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment. Korydaleus deserves consideration for two reasons in particular. (I) He was the first Greek philosopher of any stature since the fall of Constantinople. He directed the Patriarchal Academy (where he taught for seventeen years) so that it became a center of higher learning, and his teaching exerted a continuing and strong influence for two centuries. He was educated in Padua which was then a center of neo-Aristotelian studies, and wrote commentaries on Aristotle's *Organon*, *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Generation and Corruption*, and *De Anima*. (II) He is an important figure in the Renaissance among the Greeks. Now*, this statement may strike the reader as a paradox, in view of our knowledge that he was an Aristotelian. Yet the Renaissance began as a revival of the learning of antiquity; and Aristotle played a role for Korydaleus similar to Plato's for Pletho, with the additional consideration that Aristotle emphasizes the positive spirit more than Plato does. To revive Aristotle was to break with tradition; and Korydaleus was the first Greek thinker to combat scholasticism, which he regarded as a hybrid affair, a mixture of philosophy with theology. He went back to the authentic texts of Aristotle; what is more, he went back to the method and to the content of Aristotle's philosophy. His main con-

tribution was to separate philosophy from theology, knowledge from faith; he focussed on the systematic presentation of philosophy, inclusive of the study of nature. He objected to mere speculation about nature, stressing the importance of the senses, although he himself never resorted to observation (as for instance, by the telescope). Nature operates by its own laws and every natural event is determined—and determined by efficient, not final, causes. He did not reject revelation, but respected both faith and reason, distinguishing grace from nature. What he stressed was the autonomy of reason (as based on observation). God does not interfere in the operations of nature; there is no divine caprice in the production of phenomena. At the end of his commentary on Aristotle's *Generation and Corruption* he says: "if any of these doctrines contradicts sacred revelation, we must of course reject them." But, as Papanoutsos notes, Korydaleus says this only after he has expounded the doctrine in detail. As a good Aristotelian, he rejects the Christian view of the creation of the world from nothing; matter is eternal. But he modifies Aristotle's doctrine, too; apart from his rejection of final causes in nature, he maintains that matter is actual prior to its reception (or rejection) of form. In short, he is more materialistic than Aristotle; also more positivistic, in that he holds that God is only a final cause, not an efficient cause in nature. Nevertheless, his intellectual epigones fell short of their master's understanding of Aristotle; their interpretation of Aristotle tended to pedantry and the term 'Korydalism' became one of reproach in the mouth of later exponents of the Greek Renaissance.

Mention must be made of another early figure. Methodios An-thrakites (1660-1749) who was anti-Aristotelian, defended the authority of private judgment in theological as well as philosophical belief (on the ground that the Holy Spirit is present in all human beings and not merely in the Church Fathers) and taught mathematics and physics. But he was condemned by the Synod of the Patriarchate as a heretic (1723), not because of his theological teaching but because he taught geometry and physics. Anthrakites renounced his views and burned his works with his own hands.

I propose now to consider a selection of the philosophical figures of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment. Some preliminary remarks are in order.

(a) The problem of the form of the Greek language was (and still is) important, even critical, in a very special way—as reflecting the intellectual camp to which the thinker belongs. Inevitably, during the many centuries since the classical period, the Greek language has gradually changed, through internal forces as well as because of the

impact of Western, Turkish, and Slavic languages; in contrast to Atticizing Greek, the new form was Koine (common) or demotic (vernacular). The learned men tended to cling to the classical form, but the general public, in its folk-tales and poetry as well as in conversation, used the demotic. Thus, most of the philosophers with whom we will be concerned wrote in classic or semi-classic Greek although there were some (like Katarjis) who proclaimed the merits of the demotic and wrote in that form. The matter is complex. There was first a movement for the return to the use of archaic Greek, a movement whose intention was progressive, in the same way in which the return to ancient Greek thought was initiated in the Renaissance. With the passage of time, people realized that such a return was not feasible; some account had to be taken of the way in which the Greek language had evolved into the vernacular. But as the latter was considered vulgar, unsuitable for exact thought, a compromise was effected by the invention of the *Katharevousa* (puristic), a language in which the vernacular, taken as a basis, was modified by the imposition of patterns and words from ancient Greek. In this enterprise, Koraes was a leader. Around 1850, however, the role of the *Katharevousa* changed; its use became a symbol of conservatism. Today the *Katharevousa* serves as the official language of government and it is employed in the Greek universities. The battle between the two camps—the advocates of the *Katharevousa* and of the demotic, the conservatives and the progressives—is still going on; governments have fallen and even blood has been spilled during the strife. The demotic has achieved victory in literary writing, but officialdom and learning are still in the camp of the *Katharevousa*, for the most part.

(b) The contribution of the Enlightenment is not to be found in its philosophical content so much as in the fact that it introduced the attitudes, temper and methods of natural science. Between 1750 and 1820, scientific laboratories were built in various academies, equipped with appropriate instruments and including 'theaters' (places from which to observe) for demonstrations of experiments. Along with science, mathematics too was stressed. Curiously enough, mathematics operated as a symbol of progressivism (after all, though abstract, it is a manifestation of human reasoning and also served as the language of physics) and, as such, was the butt of the conservatives. There is a story about Voulgaris (see below*) into whose class in mathematics a grocer was sneaked in by the hostile camp with his grocery-accounts in order to make mockery of mathematics. The opposing parties in the hostilities were the mathematicians *vs.* the * grammarians.'

(c) There was the interplay between theology and science, the latter of which, in addition to making novel statements about the

natural world, more generally symbolized the spirit of free inquiry as contrasted with dogmatism. In the thinking of the philosophers, this interplay assumed the shape both of a conflict and of a compromise, or rather of conciliation. To the Church it appeared as a conflict between hostile parties; but to the philosophers themselves, it meant a reconciliation between revelation and reason. Most, if not all, of the philosophers, especially during the earlier period, were monks or ecclesiastics of some sort. They were honest believers, attempting to produce systems in which both dogma and intellectual inquiry and science could lie down together in peace.

(d) A notable factor in bringing about the Enlightenment was the translation of Western philosophical and scientific works into Greek. Kodrikas translated some of Fontenelle and taught the Copernican view, which the Church attempted to refute. Toward the end of our period (1798), the Church denounced all French thought as atheistic. Voulgaris translated Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* around 1766 (see "How Locke's Essay Became Known to Neo-Hellenic Thought," by Alkis Anglou; Athens, 1954). Locke's influence was exerted also by his essays on toleration and education. Clarke became known and admired at about the same time. But translations were not the only ways by which learning came from the West to Greece. The Greeks traveled to the West for their education. German teaching became increasingly important, especially in the person of the German philosopher Wolff. And as the latter was a pupil of Leibniz, Leibniz too must be included among the influences from the West.

(e) Many of the earlier Greek philosophers were really encyclopaedists, polymaths, teaching not philosophy only but also mathematics and science as well as the Greek classics. And in their philosophical views too they tended to be eclectic—at least some of them; their chief value consists in the fact that they were transmitters of the new learning, and teachers in the fullest, richest sense of the word.

Eugenios Voulgaris (1716-1806). Papanoutsos characterizes Voulgaris as the most notable intellectual figure of the Enlightenment, and Dimaras refers to him as a bridge between the old and the new age. In his long life (ninety years) Voulgaris saw and experienced many changes, accomplishments and frustrations, traveling widely within Greece and abroad, teaching in various academies, and engaging in a variety of occupations. He was both a polymath and a polygraph; he taught philosophy and theology, science and mathematics; he translated Virgil into Homeric verse; wrote history and on music; held high office in the Church and engaged in preaching. Clearly a restless and versatile man. Born in Corfu and educated in the Ionian islands and Italy, he became a cleric early in his life and began his

teaching in Yannina (Epirus). He was a turbulent spirit and markedly disputatious; as a consequence, he could not stay long at any teaching post. When the Athonias Academy (at Mt. Athos) was founded, he became its first director, and later he taught in Constantinople. Still later, he visited and resided at Halle and Leipzig where he came under the influence of Leibniz and Wolff, and engaged in publishing. Having declared his admiration for Voltaire and translated some of his works, he was called to Russia, to the Court of Catherine the Great where he found favor as a representative of the "new philosophy." He served as a librarian at the court. Later Catherine appointed him Archbishop of Slavonia and Cherson (Ukraine); thence he returned to the Russian capital and to the court entourage in 1779; finally he withdrew into a monastery where he died. In 1793, he had turned against Voltaire and denounced him.

Voulgaris favored the experimental method of science for the attainment of truth, and preached religious toleration (possibly influenced in this respect by Locke and Voltaire). He admired Gassendi, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton. As a disciple of Locke, he opposed the Aristotelianism of Korydaleus; those self-described peripatetics, he said, are unperipatetic (peripatos = walking = inquiry). And as a disciple of Leibniz, he favored the doctrine of innate ideas, with the qualification that ideas are innate owing to divine revelation. He revered the classics, finding merit both in the old and the new learning, both in revelation and in reason; he was at once dogmatic and critical, uneasily walking the tightrope—an operation in which many of the Greek philosophers of our period engaged. As he lived a long life in the course of which he altered his views frequently, it is not easy to identify him with any particular school of thought. An eclectic he certainly was. At the same time, he had an imaginative and vital intellect, capable of projecting itself to the minds of others and making disciples of them. For a considerable time, Voulgaris exerted a powerful influence over Greek thought.

His *Logic* may be considered to be his most important work; it is voluminous, running to six hundred pages, and deals not only with logic proper but with epistemology and methodology as well. While liberally quoting from Plato and Aristotle he also refers to Descartes with whom he may profitably be compared. Like Descartes he believes in the inner light of reason, that the soul is distinct from the body, that it has innate ideas and possesses a criterion of truth and falsehood. A more significant similarity is that, like Descartes, Voulgaris adapted classical rationalism to the viewpoint of natural science. While reason controls all belief, reason is not the sole source of ideas; there is also sense (and along with it, memory and imagination).

For the study of natural phenomena, observation and experiment are necessary; nevertheless, the data of sense, while necessary, are not sufficient conditions for science. The mind must construct theories to explain phenomena, that is to say, theories about the *causes* of phenomena, and such theories must be certified by observation. It is worth noting, however, that Voulgaris in his book “Concerning the System of the Universe” rejects the Copernican view and espouses the astronomical doctrines of Tycho Brahe (Papanoutsos, *op. cit.*, 31, note 1).

Iosipos Moisiodax (1730-1780). Voulgaris was only a precursor of the Enlightenment, strictly speaking; but in the figure of Moisiodax, we encounter the full flowering of the Enlightenment. Moisiodax was born in Roumania, possibly of parents who were not Greek. He was educated in the Athonias Academy under Voulgaris, and later in Padua, where he studied philosophy, mathematics, and physics. In 1765, he was appointed director of the school at Jassy, where, however, he was unable to stay long owing to the \dolent opposition he encountered at the hands of the conservatives (‘grammarians’) because of his own venturesome and radical views. He sojourned in Venice, Trieste, and Vienna, having in the meantime abandoned teaching for writing, which he preferred. Among his writings may be cited—in English titles—Theory of Geography, Apology, and Essay on Education, dominantly influenced by Locke. Despite his foreign birth, he felt himself a Greek, spoke and wrote in Greek (for the Greeks) and his thought is genuinely a part of Greek culture. He proclaimed the value of ‘healthy’ philosophy, by ‘healthy’ meaning sound, and by philosophy, all learning. Indeed by sound philosophizing he meant free inquiry and the rejection of prejudice and superstition; also all attempts to support belief by reference to authority (αὐτόν *ἴφα*, ‘he said so’). Positively, he meant the encouragement of the new learning, inclusive of mathematics and science. Nevertheless he himself was a believer, respecting religion, but also insisting on the autonomy of philosophy *vis a vis* theology. He quoted the well-known saying of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans (to the effect that God is made visible in his creation) in order to prove that even the knowledge of God is obtained from the knowledge of nature.

Circles close to the Church accused Moisiodax of being a Latinizer and an exponent of the New Philosophy; he answered by admitting the charge, saying, “I praise not only the Latins but also the Calvinists, the Lutherans, the Anabaptists, and the Orthodox.” He condemned the Church for favoring Aristotelianism and boldly declared that the Europe of his day surpassed ancient Greece—a statement

which must have struck the Greeks of his time as heresy bordering on treason. He pointed out that science had advanced far beyond the accomplishments of the ancient Greeks; to arithmetic Europe had added analysis, and to geometry the theory of curves. Furthermore, Europe had contributed the theory of gravitation, of the rotation of the earth, of the periodic revolution of the earth around the sun, and the doctrine that the earth was spherical; finally, the view that there are the same elements in the heavens as in the earth.

Moisioudax established philosophy not on logic but on mathematics. He had learned from Descartes that mathematics provides the pattern for all knowledge, whether in pure philosophy or in science. He rejected the doctrine of Voulgaris according to which metaphysics and logic are the foundation of all knowledge, saying that in order to do physics and mathematics one does not need to know logic; and that metaphysics fails to yield certainty. Doubtless, his dedication to mathematics was the other side of his rejection of 'grammarianism' and scholasticism, and for this reason he set Plato above Aristotle. Mathematics, he asserted, derives from a few primitive notions and axioms, proceeds from the simple to the complex, and attains certainty. "Galileo and Descartes brought back the mathematical way of philosophizing, at which the Aristotelians howled." He rejected Aristotle's hylomorphism in favor of the atomic theory; there is no prime matter, and since form depends on such matter, there is no form either. (But the atoms were set in motion by God.)

Newton also was a figure greatly admired by Moisioudax—Newton who had seen that mathematics is the language of natural science, i.e., of physics, mechanics, hydraulics, optics, and astronomy—all of which disciplines could be established independently of religious dogma. Moisioudax made much of the point that physics studies sensible phenomena, dealing with concrete material and therefore should be more effective in the education of the young than metaphysics and logic. Also, he said, science unifies mankind and knows no nationality.

I think it is obvious that Moisioudax was not so much a technical philosopher as an advocate and exponent of the new philosophical attitude and of the spirit of the Enlightenment. His own relation to professional philosophy may be compared to that of Huxley (in biological science) to Darwin. Once more, his linguistic preferences are relevant as an index to his philosophical liberalism; he wrote in simple demotic Greek and eschewed archaisms.

Athanasios Psalidas (1767-1829). Psalidas has the acutest mind of all the Greek philosophers of the Enlightenment; this I hope to show by providing the reader with examples of some of his argumentation. For biographical details I am indebted to Papanoutsos. Psal-

idas was born in Yannina but, when eighteen years old, migrated to Russia (where he had close relatives) and while there, studied in Nizna and Poltava. In 1787 he went to Vienna where he embarked on medical studies which he soon abandoned, preferring to them natural science and the philosophy of his day. During his stay in Vienna (which ended in 1797) he wrote various books, most of which remain unpublished. This was his most creative period when he was relatively quite young; it may also be supposed that his administrative and educational duties, which he later assumed, left him neither time nor energy for writing. At any rate, he was only twenty-four when he published (at his own expense at Vienna, and with a Latin translation by the author himself) his most important work entitled “ True Happiness (*ΑΕὐΒαγῶνία*) or the Basis of All Religion ”—a really distinguished work which deserves to be read in its own right. From Vienna he returned to Yannina where he organized a new school, teaching there for twenty-five years. In his philosophical courses he expounded Locke and Kant; he taught physics and chemistry in the experimental way, using instruments and other appropriate equipment which his enemies described as tools of Satan. Inevitably he was accused of atheism and Voltairism. Later he became director of the lyceum at the island of Lefcas, where he eventually died.

In his writings he refers to Locke, Spinoza, Voltaire, Helvetius, Hobbes, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant among others. Scholars regard him as a Kantian and it is rumored (without evidence) that he studied under Kant. But although his critical predilection in philosophy points to Kant, I find in him even greater affinities with Hume, especially Hume’s doctrine of the origin of ideas and his *Dialogues on Religion*. Nevertheless there is no evidence that Psalidas ever read Hume, and nowhere in his work does he show any critical doubt about the inductive principle. Like Hume, however, he was a plant that sprouted early in life, and like Hume, did not produce much of importance philosophically in his maturer years.

There are two ways of viewing his book called “ True Happiness or the Basis of All Religion.” The first is to look at the title and to the stated doctrines; the second is to look at the discussions and the arguments, (a) The book is a defence of revelation and an exposition of a way of life. Happiness is something to be achieved in this life and consists in an Epicurean ataraxy and peace of mind, inclusive of bodily strength and health. In order to achieve such happiness, the certain knowledge of four fundamental principles is absolutely required—namely, the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, reparation after death, and finally the freedom of the will. But none of these truths may be attained by the powders of the human mind, whether sense or imagination or right reason; thus these truths have

been given to man by divine revelation. If there be discerned a Kantian slant in Psalidas* doctrine of the limitation of human reason, his solution is nevertheless different; where Kant appealed to the supremacy of practical reason, Psalidas invokes Revelation. (This last point is made by Papanoutsos.)

Revelation was granted to the first man and thereafter became firmly established in the minds of the succeeding generations. This Revelation was, however, distorted owing to the limitations of the human mind. The earliest Revelation is contained in the books of Moses; but there may have been still earlier formulations of it from which Moses probably borrowed. Such an earlier Revelation may have been given to Abraham in hieroglyphic letters.

(b) Psalidas is most certain of the inability of human sense and reason to attain to the four truths, launching on very detailed arguments to make his point. Like the preacher whose sermons are much more convincing on the evils of sin than on the rewards of salvation, Psalidas is much more keen and effective in arguing the limitations of the human mind for knowledge than in his support of Revelation. One may well wonder whether he is a sceptic rather than a believer.

(1) Consider his refutation of the proofs for the existence of God and his denial of any rational basis for religious belief. In refuting the cosmological argument, he argues that it is based on the arbitrary assumption of the contingency of phenomena; we have no reason, he says, to think that events might have been otherwise. More to the point, there is no *empirical* basis for such a belief. The material world has its own laws which account for its behavior; since matter has powers, motion and form, so also has it order. There is no contingency, and material phenomena occur necessarily. The similarity of these considerations to some of the statements in Hume's *Dialogues on Religion* is obvious.

Furthermore, according to Psalidas, there is no need to explain the origin of the universe. No such origin (or end) is observable, and matter is eternal.

He next considers the argument from design based on the analogy of the watch to the watchmaker, and of the house to the housebuilder. Cicero had seen evidences of design in the revolutions of the moon, sun, and stars, in the beauty and order of the material universe—facts which, he alleged, could not have been produced by chance. But such an argument, Psalidas observes, is founded on an analogy which does not exist; the house is made out of pre-existing materials but the universe comes out of nothing. It is legitimate to argue from finite phenomena to other finite phenomena as their cause; it is not legitimate to extrapolate from the totality of the phenomena to an infinite cause.

The argument to a cause is permissible within experience; it is not valid to proceed to a cause transcending experience. (Once more, the similarity to Hume's argument in the *Dialogues* is striking.) If the world is to be conceived as a machine, where are the tools by which it has been constructed? St. Paul's text in the Epistle to the Romans cannot provide a basis for natural theology; it is because we already believe by means of Revelation in the existence of God as a creator, that we can argue from the creation to a creator.

(2) *The Immortality of the Soul*. It is assumed that the soul is a substance distinct from the body, because the body, allegedly, is incapable of reason. But how can we argue *from experience* about the limits of the powers of the human body? After all, experience shows that the body is active (since, in fact, we do act); there is therefore no reason to suppose that the body is inert. Here the reader is confronted with the author's doctrine of the origin of ideas. We have no idea of an immaterial being, since there is no impression to provide such an idea. All our impressions are of material things and consequently all our ideas too. So far as experience is concerned, thought is a power of the body; thus, since there is no ground for believing that there is a soul distinct from the body, neither is there one for supposing that the soul will survive the body. Inasmuch as there is no soul as such, neither can there be revelation of ideas to a soul.

(3) *Free will*. Psalidas defines free will as an action produced without the intervention of an external efficient cause; and argues that, in this sense, free will cannot be empirically known to exist. For all action depends on conception (ideas); and concepts are formed from impressions of external objects; thus, the latter are efficient causes of action. That is to say, in order to decide to do something, we must first represent it to our minds; in order thus to represent it, we must have an idea of it, and we can acquire such an idea only from an impression of external objects. More generally, the doctrine of free will is bound up with the belief of the distinctness of the soul from the body—a belief for which no evidence exists whatever.

Benjamin of Lesbos (1762-1824). Benjamin was educated in Pisa and Paris in mathematics and physics, revealing a special talent in the former. At the school in Kydoniai, he taught philosophy, mathematics, and physics. A strong outcry was raised by the reactionaries who accused him of atheism and of introducing new devils with his new-fangled scientific views (Papanoutsos, *op. cit.*, 208), such as that the earth moves and that other heavenly bodies besides the earth are inhabited by human beings. However Benjamin had also friends and admirers in the school, and, with their assistance, he defended himself before the Holy Synod in Constantinople which eventually

declared him innocent of heresy. In 1818, the governor of Wallachia invited Benjamin to reorganize the academy at Bucharest, but the attacks of his enemies forced him to abandon his post shortly thereafter. Later he became director of the school at Smyrna; with the outbreak of the War of Revolution in 1821 he took an active part in the struggle and died from an outbreak of an epidemic at Nauplion.

In Benjamin we encounter once more a figure who takes a stand against traditionalism. He rejected grammar, rhetoric and poetics as mere embellishments of the mind, and insisted on the disciplinary power of science to dissolve prejudice. Above all, he proclaimed that mathematics is the key to the understanding of the universe. "Remove," he wrote, "mathematics from the earth and you will see man crawling on the ground, unable to rise above the surface of the earth or to extend beyond the boundaries of his homeland." At the same time, he adopted Locke's empiricism inclusive of Locke's theory of the origin of ideas; he was also influenced by Locke's educational theories. But he is a thinker in his own right, clear, vigorous, and analytical.

He published a book entitled "Elements of Metaphysics" in which he construed metaphysics as primarily philosophical anthropology, or the study of man. "All the other sciences study the bodies external to man and their properties, while metaphysics is concerned with the soul itself and its properties. Thus, metaphysics is nothing but the theory and the science of the powers of the contemplating mind. Whereas, in the other sciences, the subject matter con-

sists of the bodies in heaven and earth, in metaphysics the subject matter is the mind itself, such that man is both subject and object" (quoted in Papanoutsos, *op. cit.*, 38-39). In the last two chapters Benjamin also deals with the existence of God which he demonstrates by reference to the harmony of the heavens, and the adaptation of all things in the heavens and earth to the good of man. Thus, Benjamin adopted a teleological view of nature, the end of nature being construed as man himself. He criticized and rejected Berkeley's idealism with the following arguments: He accepted Berkeley's view of the certain knowledge of our own existence; as also the view that we are limited to our own ideas. But he argued that the mind is not the cause of its ideas since it cannot control them at will. Benjamin adds the consideration that man is essentially an active being, and that man finds himself thwarted in his actions. Thus there must be a non-ego as well as an ego.

In this article I have purported to give a selection only of the philosophers of the Enlightenment. I have omitted, for instance, Nikephoros Theotokis (1731-1800), who published works on scientific topics such as electricity (magnetism), meteorology, a 'meta-

physical geography/ mathematics, etc. He is a true polymath and also a true compromiser. He asserted the need of faith and mystical insight for belief, on the ground that reason, because of its dependence on sense, is limited in extent. At the same time he was a humanist; that is to say, he held that human nature is good. Man has both appetite and anger; appetite is the desire for God, and anger is an impulse to fight the devil. I have also omitted the most important figure of Adamantius Koraes (1748-1833), a truly wise man, perhaps the greatest of the Greeks since the fall of Constantinople, a distinguished classical scholar and a friend of the French Encyclopaedists (there is an interesting correspondence between Koraes and Thomas Jefferson concerning the form of the constitution of the new Greek State). But Koraes, apart from his commentaries on the classical Greek philosophers, wrote very little on philosophy; and, in any case, he deserves a chapter all to himself.

I hope that my remarks have been sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a Greek Renaissance and Enlightenment. However, it is clear, I think, that the philosophical thinking was largely derivative (although soundly grasped and assimilated), and I do not recommend that any of my philosophical readers should go back and study the writings of these philosophers (here I make a possible exception for Psalidas). In some ways, the figures of the Enlightenment were more sages than professional philosophers, teachers rather than original thinkers, embodying the modern scientific temper rather than articulating it. What I hope to have shown, however, is that Greek thought and philosophical enterprise was not interrupted, not frustrated by the Ottoman conquest; more generally that Greek thought has been a continuous activity from the classical times on—to the present. This being the case, the Greek thinkers during the period of the Turkish occupation, and especially those of the Enlightenment, are important for the student of intellectual history and even more so for the student of Greek intellectual history.

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